War
Stories, Weapons Talks, and the Legacy of World Wars
"THE DEVIL: And I tell you that in the arts of life man
invents nothing; but in the arts of death he outdoes Nature herself, and
produces by chemistry and machinery all the slaughter of plague, pestilence and
famine. . . . There is nothing in man's industrial machinery but his greed and
sloth: his heart is in his weapons."
--from Man and Superman, by George Bernard Shaw (1903).
"Our lives are fairly
good, fairly peaceful. We seem to go on almost untouched except as the arms
race gives employment to many. Overt hysteria has declined since the fifties.
Perhaps people will have time to think. No one should say there is no hope."
--J. Robert Oppenheimer,
quoted in the final paragraph of Lawrence
and Oppenheimer, by Nuel Pharr Davis (1968).
WEAPONS AND HOPE by Freeman
Dyson; Harper Colophon Books, Harper and Row; $6.95.
By
David Trulock
“I
was sitting at home eating a quiet breakfast with my mother, when the morning
paper arrived with the news of Hiroshima,” writes Freeman Dyson in Weapons and Hope. “I understood at once what it meant. ‘Thank God for that,’ I said. I knew that Tiger Force would not fly, and I
would never have to kill anybody again.”
Tiger
Force was a fleet of 300 bombers that Winston Churchill planned to use to help
the United States defeat Japan. The
bombers were to be based in Okinawa, and in early August 1945, when the
Hiroshima bomb was dropped, Dyson was awaiting orders to leave. However, he was not expected to fly with the
bombers over Japan. He would have stayed
in Okinawa, as he had stayed in England during the bombing of Germany,
“calculating how to murder people more efficiently,” as he puts it.
In
more technical but less accurate terms, Dyson did operations research for the
Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command. He was
assigned to the job in July 1943, when he was 19 years old and had completed
two years of college mathematics.
Dyson
is now a physics professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton,
New Jersey. Although he is also a consultant to the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Defense, he no longer calculates
how to kill people more efficiently. His
hope is that the ideas in Weapons and
Hope could bring civilians and military people together in a way that might
prevent the extremely efficient form of killing that would occur in a nuclear
war.
Cultural
Patterns More Durable
Dyson’s
straightforward style of writing is, in itself, enough to make one hopeful. “I chose the title Weapons and Hope for this book,” he explains, “because I want to
discuss the gravest problem now facing mankind, the problem of nuclear weapons,
from a human rather than a technical point of view.”
He
continues by saying, “Central to my approach is a belief that human cultural
patterns are more durable than either the technology of weapons of the
political arrangements in which the weapons have become embedded.”
The
nuclear weapons problem is exacerbated by the difference in the worlds
inhabited by the people Dyson refers to as the victims of current weaponeering
plans and the warriors who make those plans.
The victims deplore the strategies of the warriors and the warriors
ignore the moral indignation of the victims.
It is Dyson’s hope that the two groups will start listening to each
other.
In
the first chapter of the book, “Agenda for a Meeting of the Minds,” Dyson
discusses why the victims and warriors don’t now listen to each other:
If
it is difficult to translate their [the peace movement’s] message effectively
into the language of the generals, it is even more difficult to translate the
legitimate concerns of the generals into a language which pays some respect to
ordinary human values and feelings. … The military establishment looks on the
peace movement as a collection of ignorant people meddling in a business they
do not understand, while the peace movement looks on the military establishment
as a collection of misguided people protected by bureaucratic formality from
all contact with human realities. Both
these preconceptions create barriers to understanding. Both preconceptions are to some extent true.
One
point of contention existing now between victims and warriors is the question
of how many people would survive a nuclear war.
The question is usually answered in quantitative terms by both sides. The victims, often quoting Jonathan Schell or
Carl Sagan, say the answer is zero—nobody would survive a nuclear war. The warriors produce various quantitative
answers quite different from zero, using calculations based partially on civil
defense measures. Dyson proposes to
“break the deadlock” by dogmatically adopting a third position:
My
dogma is that the question of survival is undecidable … . It says, since survival may be possible, it
makes sense to try to save lives. It
says, since survival may be impossible, it makes no sense to count the lives
saved.
Dysons
proposal is simple—possibly too simple for some people to understand—and
far-reaching. Accepting it would mean
that peace activists, arms controllers, and military people could no longer
engage each other in a war of numbers.
And, since all are interested in saving lives—although the military view
of saving lives is rather one-sided—there is common ground, Dyson says, for a
debate that would not be a “dialogue of the deaf.”
Targeting
Policies Clash
Perhaps
an even more important product of Dyson’s proposal is that it could provide a
better foundation for Soviet and American nuclear weapons limitation
treaties. The current nuclear weapons
policies of the Soviet Union and the United States are basically
incompatible. American strategic nuclear
policy forbids a first strike of intercontinental missiles against the Soviet
Union, but permits a first use of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of
Europe. Soviet policy is just the
reverse. It forbids a first use in
Europe, but allows a first strike against the U.S. in defense of Soviet troops
already under tactical nuclear attack.
Dyson says the world would be a safer place if both nations adopted the
same policy.
In
addition to being an important tool for arms control and an eloquent statement
of the nuclear weapons problem, Dyson's book offers also some illuminating and
entertaining "war stories," as he calls them. One of the stories begins
with Dyson as a high school student, walking home from a music lesson after
school. On his daily walks home, Dyson passed through a World War I monument
known as the War Cloister. It was dedicated to the soldiers from his small
school who’d died in what was then referred to simply as The War. The 600 names are carved on the outside wall
of the monument.
On
the day Dyson writes about, it is almost dark as he passes through one of the
three openings in the War Cloister's wall. In the near darkness, he sees clearly,
he says, "a young man in the uniform of The War." Dyson looks again,
and the young man is not there. He tells his friends later and they do not find
his story hard to believe. "We were agnostics," Dyson explains,
"not quite believing in ghosts and not quite disbelieving."
Dyson
and his friends were also ardent pacifists, no doubt in large part due to the
stories they had heard their parents tell about The War. Dyson and his pacifist
friends had trouble identifying with any of the politicians or movements of the
time. "Feeling
ourselves doomed, we were comforted by the thought that the whole society in which
we lived was doomed equally," he writes. "We
saw no hope that any acceptable future would emerge from the coming war. We had
made up our minds that we would not be led like sheep to the slaughter as the
class of 1915 had been."
But
pacifism lost its moral luster for Dyson with the establishment of the Vichy
government in France in 1940. The Vichy government was in a sense pacifist, having
abandoned violent resistance to Hitler in favor of collaboration with the
Nazis. Dyson writes that pacifism was destroyed as a moral force once it became
impossible to distinguish the sincere pacifists from opportunists and
collaborators.
War
Stories as Parables
Soon
after the capitulation of France, Dyson re-enlisted in the Officers Training
Corps. In less than three years, he worked his way into the very headquarters
of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, where he found himself recommending
flight patterns that would decrease the losses of Allied bombers to German
fighters while at the same time increasing the number of bomber collisions.
"After
the war ended," he writes, "I read reports of the trials of men who
had been high up in the Eichmann organization. They had sat in their offices,
writing memoranda and calculating how to murder people more efficiently, just
like me. The main difference was that they were sent to jail or hanged as war
criminals, while I went free. I felt a certain sympathy for these men. Probably
many of them loathed the SS as much as I loathed Bomber Command, but they, too,
had not had the courage to speak out. Probably many of them. like me, lived
through the whole six years of the war without ever seeing a dead human
being."
Throughout
the book there are other stories that may better be described as parables.
Dyson describes the importance of parables in the final paragraph of the first
chapter of Weapons and Hope:
When I look back
into the past, I find in the two world wars the richest source of parables to
help us see where we are going. That is why this book is filled with war
stories. The most important lessons come from World War I. World War I, taken as a whole, is a gigantic
parable of the war we are trying to avoid. It was a war of peculiar ugliness,
fought with exceptional stupidity and brutality. It destroyed permanently a
great part of European civilization. It was started for reasons which in
retrospect seem almost trivial. The damage and loss suffered by all parties
were utterly out of proportion to the initial quarrel between Serbia and
Austria. In all these respects, the
history of World War I holds up a mirror to us, showing us how small follies
lead to great disasters, how ordinarily intelligent people walk open-eyed into
hell.